1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS (Boston)
3	No. 1:20-cv-11104-WGY
4	
5	VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CENTER, et al,
6	Plaintiffs
7	VS.
8	
9	ELIZABETH D. DeVOS, in her official capacity as Secretary of Education, et al,
10	Defendants
11	****
12	
13	For Zoom Hearing Before:
14	Judge William G. Young
15	Preliminary Injunction
16	rieliminary injunction
17	United States District Court
18	District of Massachusetts (Boston) One Courthouse Way
19	Boston, Massachusetts 02210 Wednesday, September 2, 2020
20	
21	*****
22	
23	REPORTER: RICHARD H. ROMANOW, RPR Official Court Reporter
24	United States District Court One Courthouse Way, Room 5510, Boston, MA 02210
25	bulldog@richromanow.com

```
1
                      A P P E A R A N C E S
 2
 3
    DAVID A. NEWMAN, ESQ.
    NATALIE FLEMING-NOLEN, ESQ.
 4
       Morrison & Foerster, LLP
       2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, Suite 6000
 5
       Washington, DC 2006-1888
       (202) 887-1577
 6
       Email: Dnewman@mofo.com
   and
    SHIWALI G. PATEL, ESQ.
       National Women's Law Center
8
       11 Dupont Circle, NW
       Suite 800
       Washington, DC 20036
 9
       (202) 319-3030
       Email: Spatel@nwlc.org
10
       For Plaintiffs
11
12
    JENNIFER B. DICKEY, ESQ.
       U.S. Department of Justice
13
       Office of the Associate Attorney General
       950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
14
       Washington, DC 20530
       (202) 514-0124
       Email: Jennifer.b.dickey@usdoj.gov
15
       For Defendants
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

PROCEEDINGS

(Begins, 3:00 p.m.)

THE CLERK: Now hearing Civil Matter 20-11104, Victim Rights Law Center vs. DeVos.

attending on this session of the court. This is a hearing conducted via zoom and in this pandemic time such hearings are authorized by statute, regulation, and the local rules of this court. It's presided -- or our host at the hearing is Courtroom Deputy Clerk, Jennifer Gaudet, I have on the line our Official Court Reporter, Rich Romanow, and law clerks. This is a public hearing of the court and the press and the public are welcome. I have no idea whether anyone else is on the line, but on the theory that they may be, let me say that you must keep your mics muted and that the rules of court remain in full force and effect and that means there will be no rebroadcast, taping, streaming, or other transmission of this hearing.

It's also appropriate, before I have counsel who will argue introduce themselves, to acknowledge with gratitude the briefs filed by the various amici, all of which the Court has considered, and I appreciate them.

Now would counsel introduce themselves starting with the plaintiffs.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. NEWMAN: Your Honor, David Newman from Morrison & Foerster on behalf of the plaintiff. My co-counsel, Ms. Fleming-Nolan, is here on the screen and will also be presenting argument as well, as will my Co-counsel, Ms. Shiwali G. Patel. THE COURT: Well we'll see. But thank you. And for the Secretary? MS. DICKEY: Ms. Jennifer Dickey, your Honor. THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Dickey. MS. DICKEY: Good afternoon, your Honor. THE COURT: Anyone else? (Silence.) THE COURT: Well the reason -- I don't mean to be brusk in any way and I want you to know that while I compliment the amici, so do I thank the parties for their careful consideration of these issues, which are important issues. Having said that, the place I want to start here, and it's a question for the plaintiffs, is it would seem that the college plaintiffs, the individual college plaintiffs don't have standing, and that's because it appears, without dispute, that the two colleges involved, um, are going to enforce these regulations prospectively and are not going to enforce them retroactively. Now whatever may be the case of the college plaintiffs, um, it would appear that these

```
regulations don't bear on their cases and for that
 1
 2
     reason I ought dismiss the college plaintiffs. And I'm
 3
     not clear on the secondary school plaintiffs and we'll
     ask about that.
 4
 5
           But isn't that true? And I'll ask plaintiffs'
 6
     counsel.
 7
           MS. FLEMING-NOLEN: Your Honor, this is Natalie
8
     Fleming-Nolen from Morrison & Foerster, and, um, we do
 9
     not think that is true, your Honor. There are more than
10
     two colleges involved here, we have the UC Santa
11
     Barbara, we have Harvard, um, as well as UNH. And so
12
     there are, um, multiple colleges involved. And the
13
     colleges --
14
           THE COURT: Wait. Wait. Wait. Wait just
15
     a minute. You're telling me that the named plaintiffs
16
     -- and I have no problem with pseudonyms here, but
17
     you're telling me that the named plaintiffs include
     someone from UNH?
18
19
           MS. FLEMING-NOLEN: Yes, your Honor.
20
           THE COURT: The named plaintiffs?
           MS. FLEMING-NOLEN: Yes, your Honor.
21
22
           THE COURT: All right. And so let's
23
     limit ourselves to the colleges you first recited.
24
     Shouldn't I dismiss those two, the people in those
25
     colleges?
```

MS. FLEMING-NOLEN: As meaning UC Santa Barbara and Harvard, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, because from those -- from those two we know that they're going to go on a two-track system.

MS. FLEMING-NOLEN: Your Honor, I think that there is still a lack of clarity for the UC system as to how they're going to resolve, um, our clients' claims. And, your Honor, I think that, um, additionally that the clients have lost something tangible, they've lost the ability of the federal government to say their schools must proceed in a certain way, but their schools are deliberately indifferent against the claims. They have no remedy from the Office of Civil Rights because the final rule has said the claims --

THE COURT: Just a moment. Just a moment. That would be true -- I mean you're making a claim against the, um, guidance from the Department of Education long before these regulations came into effect? I didn't read your complaint that broadly. I read that it was addressed to these regulations, the ones that came into effect on the 14th of August.

MS. FLEMING-NOLEN: Yes, your Honor, that's true. Under previous guidance, claims from our individual plaintiffs would have been required -- the group would

have been required to take actions in the same line. But under the final rule, if they don't fall within the definition of "sexual harassment," either because they filed claims after they graduated or because of the location of the assault, then they are at the mercy of what their schools decide to do and they have lost the ability to go to the Office of Civil Rights and say that their school had treated them unfairly and that they suffered a civil rights violation. So their rights under the federal law have been narrowed by the final rule.

THE COURT: With all respect, I find that very difficult to, um, comprehend and the plaintiffs from USC, Santa Barbara, and Harvard are dismissed, without prejudice. You have 30 days from today's date to file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint as to those plaintiffs specifically setting forth the basis and pleading with some specificity what you have tried to articulate that they have lost.

Now let's turn to the motion for preliminary injunction. I'm disposed to consolidate that motion with trial on the merits and give you a prompt trial, and by "prompt trial," I mean a trial within days, and I'm going to ask you how long you want to prepare for such a trial.

And in making that -- in answering that question, um, I'm not saying this covers the whole universe of questions, but I have various factual questions, and I will pose them, and you can -- you can either answer now or you can, um, take some time and then answer in an evidentiary sense. But please listen to my questions because I think these questions bear on the ultimate result here.

Now I do want to know, and counsel quite properly raised it, that if I have missed the plaintiff from UNH, as to that plaintiff and the ones from the secondary schools, I want to know whether any of those institutions, um, intend to apply these new regulations, um, that went into effect on August 14th? I want to know if they intend to apply them retroactively? And it seems to me that's a matter capable of ascertainment.

On the same score I want to know whether, um, with respect to any of those institutions or others, the Department is taking a position, communicating to the institutions that these rules must be or should be or, um, suggest that there's guidance that they be applied retroactive.

Also, I want to know -- though the rules on their face say that they are prospective, I want to know under what guidelines the Department -- and this is a question

for the government here and I expect the government to answer. Under what guidelines does the government intend to enforce Title IX with respect to conduct occurring before August 14th? And here's why I ask.

Is the 2001 guidance still operative? There's a blog post from the Department that suggests that only regulations issued prior to August 14th carry weight.

Now this may be an issue to which plaintiffs' counsel once averted, and if so, that's a serious matter. I want to know the government's position on that.

Also, moving on, um, and I'm talking now about the organizational plaintiffs. This is very thin, um, and I say this with respect, to how the missions of the organizational plaintiffs are -- and after August 14th are -- how are they being frustrated, and is it possible to tie that frustration to particular provisions of the rule? It's not enough just to object to the rule. I have little doubt that organizational plaintiffs, at least at first blush, may have standing. But unless their organizational goals are being frustrated as organizations, that there's a real question about their standing.

Now some specific questions for the government, and it goes to specific provisions of these new rules.

The -- did the Department, in developing these new

regulations, is there any evidence -- did the Department ever consider making this blanket exclusion of the rules against hearsay, with their exceptions, discretionary to schools? What consideration was given to that? And I'm -- I must say, or rather I'm going to question when we get to substantive argument, um, that I don't understand how, um, permitting reliable and probative evidence that's received in every administrative agency of the federal government and the federal courts throughout the land by force of law and which in criminal cases, um, passes muster under the confrontation clause is now to be swept aside. I just -- I'm going to have to hear the argument on that.

And then with respect to this unaffiliated complainant exclusion, um, I want to know how the Department or if the Department considered deterrence? You know if someone is withdrawn because of sexual harassment, or one can think of a myriad of situations, and then they are -- they are unaffiliated complainants, um, I'm not so clear as to why, when this guidance says "Now don't get into those matters," how that advances the beneficent goal of deterrence against sexual harassment?

Now I'm sure I'll have other questions, but these are the questions that, as I prepared for this, I'm

```
going to be asking. And, um, I just think it's
1
     counterproductive to hold a hearing on a preliminary
 2
     injunction and go all through that when there isn't much
     additional evidence we're going to need here, um, that I
 4
 5
     can see. We need to know the position of the various
 6
     schools at issue as to the individual plaintiffs, but
     the rest of it all, um, is either known now or, um,
8
     capable of ready ascertainment, and there's a record
     here.
 9
10
           So I don't see, from the materials before me, um,
11
     answers to those questions, and that's why, under
12
     Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a), I want to go to
     trial on the merits, but trial on the merits within days
13
14
     or longer, if the parties agree.
15
           So we'll start with the plaintiffs. When do you
     want a trial in this case?
16
17
           (Silence.)
           THE COURT: The plaintiffs?
18
19
           (Silence.)
20
           MS. FLEMING-NOLEN: Yes, your Honor -- and this is
21
     Ms. Fleming-Nolen, and we are -- we are kind of
22
     consulting a little bit at the moment with our
     co-counsel so we don't have a --
23
24
           THE COURT: Sure, well that's fine, let's go to
25
     the -- let's go to the Secretary in the Department.
```

How about the Department?

MS. DICKEY: Your Honor, we would ask for 45 to 60 days to prepare, but of course, um, we're happy to consult with plaintiffs' counsel.

THE COURT: I don't understand, why do you need that time? The advantages of a prompt trial seem to, um, aid both parties equally because if you get a prompt trial, you get a judgment, and the judgment is whatever it is, I support it with any reasonings, and then you can go to a court higher than me. And I -- I'm not -- there's no false modesty there or is there any pride of place, but these are not insignificant issues, this is litigation that's pending in a number of different courts, the government appears to be well-prepared here. I just don't see the need for some sort of argument that doesn't lead us anywhere, just takes us to some preliminary determinations and more questions and the like, that's going to drag the thing out. Why do you need so long?

MS. DICKEY: Your Honor, if what you're envisioning is, um -- I'm sharing your point, but on the merits I propose to having to present witnesses for whom we would do depositions in advance. But because this is an APA matter, we can proceed quickly for a hearing just on the administrative record, if that is what the Court

prefers.

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Well it's not a question of my preference because you get all the rights that you have under the law, so put my preference to one side, but you do understand perfectly what I contemplate and that's why I -- that's what I asked you, and I'll ask the plaintiffs. I mean what evidence am I going to have to take here? I've tried to flag for you questions that I have. But some of those questions are answered, um, from the administrative record or lacune in the administrative record. The only real evidence that we need to track down is the position as to the individual plaintiffs of the particular schools, are they going to do a two-track and -- and I do want an answer on, um -because it is unclear, I want the Department's position on the questions I've asked. If this is, um -- and I don't suggest it is in any way, but if there's some sort of retroactive slight-of-hand, I am thinking of a proceeding that is sufficient to uncover it. But other than that, you know, I'm fine, we could start Monday if we can get answers.

So with that in mind, you don't need 45 or 60 days?

MS. DICKEY: No, your Honor, we could proceed much faster.

THE COURT: Sure. I'm sure you can.

Okay, now let's go back to the plaintiffs. Have you had enough time to consult?

MR. NEWMAN: Yes, your Honor. In light of your Honor's remark, we envision 30 days being an appropriate time period, if your Honor is amenable, in part because that would permit us to get a better factual understanding of what is actually occurring at the school given the recency of the start of the school.

THE COURT: 30 days makes sense to me. Having said that -- and I'm not trying to constrain everyone, and when I spoke to the government attorney, I meant that in all sincerity. You have all the rights that are afforded you under the law and under the rules of procedure. But I contemplate a focused hearing. That should be enough time to find out definitely with respect to the named -- the pseudonymously-named plaintiffs and the schools that I've left in, how they intend to proceed. Without the necessity of formal discovery, I should think you'd be able to stipulate to that. And likewise I cast the Department with giving me some answers as to what its intentions are. And against that background, it seems to me we're able to, um -- we're able to proceed.

Now if by -- if suddenly we're looking at vast

```
case management orders and the like, um, I've made a
 1
 2
     mistake and I'll have to think again. But 30 days makes
 3
     sense. Let's ask the government.
           Is 30 days sufficient?
 4
 5
           MS. DICKEY: That's sufficient for us.
 6
           THE COURT: All right.
 7
           Have I engendered any questions you want to ask me
8
     before I have the Clerk set the matter down for trial
 9
     with a specific date? And I'll start, as I should, with
10
     the plaintiffs. Any questions?
11
           MR. NEWMAN: Your Honor, in respect to the
12
     administrative record, I think given the 30-day trial
13
     date, we would respectfully request that the government
14
     provide that to us on a short time frame as they're
15
     able. We understand that in other challenges
16
     proceedings with respect to the same rule, they may be
17
     providing a record as early as into next week and we --
           THE COURT: That makes perfect sense and I expect
18
19
     their cooperation and I expect the record to be produced
20
     as rapidly as possible.
21
           Any other questions?
           (Silence.)
22
23
           THE COURT: And for the government, any questions?
24
           MS. DICKEY: No, your Honor.
25
           THE COURT: Well I thank you. I -- I don't mean
```

this to be anticlimactic, but I -- these are not insignificant matters and I really think all parties will be benefitted by a prompt trial.

Now we'll turn to the Courtroom Deputy Clerk for whom I, in a very literal sense, I work, and she will suggest a date for the trial.

Now if you could stipulate to all the facts, um, we can set it down for the afternoon. I'm going to set it down for a morning on the possibility that there might have to be some limited evidence. It's clearly jury-waived, but candidly I don't -- I don't expect that, I expect you to agree upon the factual situation. And, um, since this will be final argument, each side will get a half an hour, and you're entitled then to full findings and rulings and it will be my duty to provide it.

So Ms. Gaudet will suggest a morning and, um -but I expect from you, if you actually think that I have
to take some evidence because there's some credibility
issue, which I think is very unlikely, then you must
give me notice.

So, Ms. Gaudet?

THE CLERK: Wednesday, October 14th.

THE COURT: Wednesday the 14th of October at

25 9:00 a.m.

```
Is that satisfactory to the plaintiffs?
1
 2
           MR. NEWMAN: I'm looking at the faces on the
 3
     screen as well, your Honor, but with the folks in the
     room here at Morrison Foerster the answer is "Yes." And
 4
 5
     I see now a nod on the screen, so the answer is "Yes."
 6
           THE COURT: And I thank you.
 7
           And for the government?
8
           MS. DICKEY: That's fine for the government as
9
     well. Thank you.
10
           THE COURT: Very well. It's set down for a
11
     hearing on the merits on the 14th of October at
12
     9:00 a.m., the parties to give earliest notice should it
13
     be believed that any evidence need be received. And I
     do thank you very much. The work that's been done is
14
15
     very helpful to the Court.
16
           And with that I think we'll stand in recess.
17
           (Ends, 3:30 p.m.)
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

C E R T I F I C A T EI, RICHARD H. ROMANOW, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, do hereby certify that the foregoing record is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes before Judge William G. Young, on Thursday, September 3, 2020, to the best of my skill and ability. /s/ Richard H. Romanow 09-17-20 RICHARD H. ROMANOW Date